Lunch Seminar: Jean-Paul L’Huillier - EIEF
January 19, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
News, Noise and Fluctuations: an Empirical Investigation
Abstract:
I will present some new results for our paper. Old abstract: We explore empirically models of aggregate fluctuations with two basic ingredients: agents form anticipations about the future based on noisy sources of information; these anticipations affect spending and output in the short run. Our objective is to separate fluctuations due to actual changes in fundamentals (news) from those due to temporary errors in the private sector’s estimates of these fundamentals (noise). Using a simple model where the consumption random walk hypothesis holds exactly, we address some basic methodological issues and take a first pass at the data. First, we show that if the econometrician has no informational advantage over the agents in the model, structural VARs cannot be used to identify news and noise shocks. Next, we develop a structural Maximum Likelihood approach which allows us to identify the model’s parameters and to evaluate the role of news and noise shocks. Applied to postwar U.S. data, this approach suggests that noise shocks play an important role in short-run fluctuations.
Stefano Rossi - Imperial College London
January 20, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks and Financial Institutions
Abstract
We build a model where sovereign defaults weaken banks’ balance sheets because banks hold sovereign bonds, causing private credit to decline. Stronger financial institutions boost default costs by amplifying these balance-sheet effects. This yields a novel complementarity between public debt and domestic credit markets, where the latter sustain the former by increasing the costs of default. Confirming our model’s predictions, we document three novel empirical facts: public defaults are followed by large private credit contractions; these contractions are stronger in countries where banks hold more public debt and financial institutions are stronger; in these same countries default is less likely.
Vincent Pohl - Yale University (Job Market Seminar)
January 23, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
Manasa Patnam - University of Cambridge (Job Market Seminar)
January 24, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
Joaquin Blaum - MIT (Job Market Seminar)
January 27, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
Rui Silva - University of Chicago (Job Market Seminar)
January 30, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
Lunch Seminar: Marco Lippi - University of Rome “La Sapienza” & EIEF
January 31, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Bruno Ferman - MIT (Job Market Seminar)
February 3, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
Margarida Soares - University of Chicago (Job Market Seminar)
February 4, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:00 pm
Camille Landais - Stanford University (Job Market Seminar)
February 9, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
Larry Epstein - Boston University
February 13, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Bayesian Inference and Non-Bayesian Prediction and Choice; Foundations and an Application to Entry Games with Multiple Equilibria
Mu-Jeung Yang - U.C. Berkeley (Job Market Seminar)
February 20, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
Luigi Iovino - MIT (Job Market Seminar)
February 24, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
Xiaodong Fan - University of Wisconsin-Madison (Job Market Seminar)
February 27, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
Peter Cziraki - Tilburg University (Job Market Seminar)
February 29, 2012
from 4:30 pm to 6:00 pm
Sudipto Bhattacharya - London School of Economics and CEPR
March 5, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Marco Ottaviani - Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
March 12, 2012
from 4:00 pm to 5:30 pm
Lunch Seminar: Julia Thomas - The Ohio State University and NBER
March 13, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
LABOUR Lecture: Charles F. Manski - Northwestern University
March 20, 2012
from 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm
Edward Prescott - Arizona State University
March 20, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Workshop on “European Sovereign Debt: Two Proposals”
March 21, 2012
from 10:00 am to 1:00 pm
For further details, please see the Program.
Please note that participation is free but registration is required due to space constraints.
LABOUR Lecture: Charles F. Manski - Northwestern University
March 22, 2012
from 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm
Christopher Taber - University of Wisconsin-Madison
March 22, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Cyril Monnet - Universität Bern
March 26, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Claudio Michelacci - CEMFI
March 29, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Lunch Seminar: Tommaso Nannicini - Bocconi University
April 2, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Scott Fulford - Boston College
April 2, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Special Lecture: Larry Epstein - Boston University
April 3, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 7:00 pm
Special Lecture: Larry Epstein - Boston University
April 4, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 7:00 pm
Michelle Sovinsky - University of Zurich
April 5, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Lunch Seminar: Rodrigo Caputo - Bank of Chile
April 10, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Monetary Policy Rules for a Two-Speed World Economy
2nd Workshop on Structural Approaches to Productivity and Industrial Dynamics
April 12, 2012
from 12:00 pm to 6:30 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events
2nd Workshop on Structural Approaches to Productivity and Industrial Dynamics
April 13, 2012
from 8:30 am to 6:00 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events
Lunch Seminar: Joacim Tåg - Research Institute of Industrial Economics
April 16, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Juan Sanchez - St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank
April 16, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Sergei Kovbasyuk - EIEF
April 19, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Optimal Certification Design
Abstract:
A public rating of a product is issued by a certifier who internalizes the buyers’ surplus and receives payments from a seller. A rating scheme compatible with Bayesian updating by buyers is characterized when the payment to the certifier is 1) fixed, 2) contingent on the rating and publicly known, 3) contingent on the rating and privately known to the seller and the certifier. A feasible rating scheme under contingent private payment implies coarse ratings and pooling on the top property: high ratings are issued for a wide range of qualities.
If the seller were to choose the rating scheme, then under a contingent public payment she would induce pooling up to some quality threshold and perfect revelation afterwards. Under a private contingent payment or a fixed payment she would induce complete pooling. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a regulation that prohibits public contingent payments may harm information revelation and social welfare. A desirable regulation calls for transparent payments between the seller and the certifier.
David Dorn - CEMFI
April 19, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Trade Adjustment: Worker-Level Evidence
Abstract:
In the past two decades, China’s manufacturing exports have grown spectacularly. U.S. imports from China have surged, while U.S. exports to China have increased more modestly, consistent with the two countries’ divergent current account imbalances. Using data on individual earnings by employer from the Social Security Administration, we examine how workers in manufacturing industries exposed to import competition from China have fared in terms of labor income, employment, job mobility, and receipt of Social Security benefits. Over the period 1992 to 2007, workers who in 1991 were employed in industries that experienced high subsequent levels of import growth have more years with zero labor earnings, lower cumulative earnings over the period, and a greater likelihood of receiving Social Security Disability Insurance as the only recorded source of income in a given year. More exposed individuals spend less time working for their initial employers, less time working in their initial two-digit manufacturing industries, and more time working elsewhere in manufacturing. Effects on earnings and employment are much larger for women than for men, and also larger for individuals whose initial employers were relatively large, whose initial wages where below their firm’s average, and who in the pre-sample period worked part time or intermittently. Individuals who work in regions more exposed to import growth (beyond their industry of employment) have more years with zero labor earnings as well. We obtain similar results using alternative measures of trade exposure. Our findings suggest that there is significant worker-level adjustment cost to import shocks and that adjustment is highly uneven across individuals according their conditions of employment in the pre-shock period.
Andrea Gamba - University of Warwick
April 23, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Special Lecture: Larry Epstein - Boston University
April 24, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Richard Blundell - University College London
April 26, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
“Empirical Evidence and Tax Reform”
Abstract:
This paper examines the role of evidence in drawing up the recommendations for tax reform in the Mirrlees Review. The arguments are organised loosely under five related headings: (i) Key margins of adjustment, (ii) Measurement of effective tax rates, (iii) The importance of information and complexity, (iv) Evidence on the size of responses, and (v) Implications from theory for tax design. Although the Mirrlees Review focusses on all aspects of tax reform, the focus is this paper is on the taxation of earnings with some examples drawn from the taxation of consumption and savings.
Conference on “Economics of Interactions and Culture”
April 27, 2012
from 9:00 am to 7:00 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events
Conference on “Economics of Interactions and Culture”
April 28, 2012
from 9:00 am to 7:00 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events
Joel Peress - INSEAD
April 30, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Special Lecture: Larry Epstein - Boston University
May 2, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 7:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Karl Walentin - Sveriges Riksbank
May 3, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Liran Einav - Stanford University
May 3, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Lunch Seminar: Valentino Dardanoni - University of Palermo
May 4, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
The Welfare Cost of Unpriced Heterogeneity in Insurance Markets
Abstract:
We consider the welfare loss of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets, which results when private information or regulatory constraints prevent insurance companies to set premiums reflecting expected costs.
We propose a methodology which uses survey data to measure this welfare loss.
After identifying some ‘deep types’ which determine expected risk and insurance demand, we use these deep types to derive the demand and cost functions for each unobservable type, quantifying the efficiency costs of unpriced heterogeneity.
We apply our methods to the US Long-Term Care and Medigap insurance markets, where we find that unpriced heterogeneity causes substantial inefficiency.
Special Lecture: Larry Epstein - Boston University
May 4, 2012
from 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm
Andreas Stathopoulos - USC Marshall School of Business
May 7, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Special Lecture: Rajnish Mehra - Arizona State University
May 8, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Lunch Seminar: Robert Chirinko (University of Illinois - Chicago)
May 9, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Job Creation Tax Credits and Job Growth: Evidence from the U.S. States
Abstract:
An unemployment rate remaining unacceptably high and monthly job gains barely keeping pace with labor force growth have generated discussions about innovative fiscal policy instruments, such as job creation tax credits (JCTCs), to help stimulate labor demand. This paper studies the effects of JCTCs enacted by U.S. states over the past 20 years. Twenty-three states have adopted JCTCs, and their experiences provide a rich source of information for assessing the effectiveness of such policies. We investigate whether JCTCs affect employment growth before, at, and after the time they go into effect. These questions are investigated in an event study framework applied to monthly panel data on employment, the JCTC effective and legislative dates, and various controls. We find that the JCTC elasticity of employment is 0.35. This estimate suggests that President Obama’s recently proposed JCTC would create 280,000 more jobs and would lower the unemployment rate by 0.1 percentage points.
Special Lecture: Rajnish Mehra - Arizona State University
May 10, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Lunch Seminar: Emanuela Cardia - Université de Montréal
May 10, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
The Household Revolution: Childcare, Housework, and Female Labor Force Participation
Roberto Pancrazi - Toulouse School of Economics
May 10, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Effects of Banks and Households’ Optimism on Collateralized Debt: The Case of Home Equity Extraction
Abstract:
The last two decades have been characterized by a boom in the credit market for collateralized debt, namely mortgages and home equity loans, which led to a severe financial crisis. In this paper, we first document that players on both sides of the credit market, i.e. banks and households, were over-optimistic about future housing prices. We propose a parsimonious statistical approach to model biased expectations, aimed to capture information incompleteness about the data generating process. We then propose a more general model of a collateralized credit market, where households choose how much to borrow and whether to repay their debt, and banks decide the quantity of credit supplied, taking into account default possibilities. We show that over-optimistic expectations lead to severe distortions on the credit market, resulting in a large quantity of debt issued at a low price. We finally investigate the role of different policies in eliminating these distortions.
Miklos Koren - Central European University
May 14, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Technology Transfer through Capital Imports: Firm-level Evidence
Abstract:
What is the effect of imported technology on firm productivity? To study this question, we develop a dynamic model of firm investment and importing decisions and estimate it in Hungarian firm-level panel data. Our preliminary results indicate that (i) The share of imported capital is strongly positively related to productivity; (ii) Imports from R&D abundant countries matter more for productivity than imports from low-R&D countries; (ii) Imported capital and imported material inputs are complementary, which strengthens the productivity effect.
Special Lecture: Rajnish Mehra - Arizona State University
May 15, 2012
from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Danila Serra - Florida State University
May 16, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Special Lecture: Rajnish Mehra - Arizona State University
May 17, 2012
from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm
Neale Mahoney - Harvard University
May 17, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Lunch Seminar: Jean-Paul L’Huillier - EIEF
May 18, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Technological Revolutions and Debt Hangovers: Is There a Causal Link?
Abstract:
Three major private debt caused recessions in developed economies — the Great Recession, the Japanese crisis of the 90s, and the Great Depression — have been preceded by periods of great technological innovation and economic transformation. Motivated by this fact, we write a business cycle model featuring imperfect information. We estimate this model using time series data for the three episodes. This exercise, together with other reduced form evidence, allows us to highlight some similarities between the three episodes. Indeed, our estimates suggest that these economies have gone through a slow moving process in which a technological revolution creates a boom in productivity, followed by a vague of optimism about the long run. The end of the boom implied a slowdown of innovation, together with a slowdown of aggregate productivity growth. Because of imperfect information, beliefs were persistent and, therefore, the private sector remained optimistic for a sizeable period of time even after the slowdown of productivity. We analyze the implications of optimism in a model with explicit borrowing and lending. In the model, the degree of optimism observed in the data implies a large accumulation of debt. The debt burden coupled with the slowdown of productivity can drag the economy into a long recession lasting, according to our estimates, about 10 years.
Rodolfo Manuelli - Washington University of St. Louis
May 21, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Special Lecture: Rajnish Mehra - Arizona State University
May 24, 2012
from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm
Alessandra Voena - Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University
May 24, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Prenuptial Agreements and Household Welfare: Evidence from Italy
Abstract:
This paper examines the welfare implications of a particular kind of prenuptial agreement, which allows Italian couples to costlessly choose at the time of marriage how they want their assets to be divided in case of divorce. Using unique administrative data on marriages and divorces from 1995 to 2009, it shows that both separation of property and community property are popular choices among Italian couples, and that the choice of regime is systematically correlated with the couples’ characteristics. These patterns of correlations are consistent with a model in which some couples decide to commit to a property division rule that will require splitting assets equally, as they anticipate that one spouse will be making substantial marriage-specific investments, while other couples choose to hold their assets in separation of property, as both spouses are able to maintain good economic outside options to the marriage. For the couples who choose separation of property, the welfare benefits of foregoing community property are sizable, and increasing in the wife’s permanent income.
Lunch Seminar: Luigi Paciello - EIEF
May 28, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Monetary Shocks with Observation and Menu Costs (with F. Alvarez and F. Lippi)
Abstract:
We compute the impulse response of output and prices to an aggregate monetary shock in a general equilibrium model where firms set prices subject to observation and menu costs. We study how the predictions about the aggregate effects of monetary shocks depend on the relative size of the information and adjustment frictions.
We find that empirically reasonable observations costs increase the impact and the persistence of the output response to monetary shocks with respect to models with menu cost only. However, we also find that the large power of monetary shocks typical of models with Calvo type exogenous adjustments cannot be rationalized with any empirically reasonable combination of menu and observation costs.
Thomas M. Mertens - NYU Stern
May 28, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Antonio Peyrache - University of Queensland
May 29, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
CONSOB - EIEF Seminar: Andrew Ellul - Indiana University
May 31, 2012
from 3:00 pm to 4:30 pm
Giovanni Calice - University of Southampton
May 31, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Benjamin Moll - Princeton University
June 4, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Cheti Nicoletti - University of York
June 7, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Summer Lecture: Guillermo Ordonez - Yale University
June 11, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 7:00 pm
Traditional and Shadow Banking
Juan Pablo Nicolini - Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
June 11, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Monetary Policy and the Quantity Theory of Money
Summer Lecture: Guillermo Ordonez - Yale University
June 12, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 7:00 pm
Traditional and Shadow Banking
Summer Lecture: Paola Giuliano - UCLA
June 14, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
(1) Cultural Origin of Gender Roles; (2) Family Ties and Economic Outcomes
Summer lecture: Mike Golosov - Princeton University
June 14, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Principles of Optimal Taxation
Summer Lecture: Nancy Qian - Yale University
June 14, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm
Food Development, War and Famine
Marianne Bertrand - University of Chicago
June 14, 2012
from 4:30 pm to 6:00 pm
Trickle-Down Consumption
Abstract:
While incomes of the non-rich in the United States have only risen slowly over the last three decades, incomes in the upper part of the income distribution have risen sharply. Concurrently, the average savings rate has been in decline. We ask whether these two trends are related: does rising consumption among (increasingly richer) rich households induce the non-rich to consume more? We find evidence consistent with this, suggesting that up to a quarter of the decline in the savings rate over the last three decades could be attributed to trickle-down consumption. Additional tests argue against permanent income explanations and against upwardly-biased expectations of future income. Consistent with the trickle-down interpretation of our core finding, households exposed to more spending by the rich self-report more financial duress. Likewise, higher top income levels are predictive of more personal bankruptcy filings. Finally, looking to the political economy implications in both federal and state legislations, we find evidence that, holding ideology constant, legislators that represent areas where income inequality is higher are more likely to vote in favor of policies that increase credit availability or decrease the cost of credit.
Summer Lecture: Paola Giuliano - UCLA
June 15, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
(1) Cultural Origin of Gender Roles; (2) Family Ties and Economic Outcomes
Summer lecture: Mike Golosov - Princeton University
June 15, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Principles of Optimal Taxation
Summer Lecture: Nancy Qian - Yale University
June 15, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm
Food Development, War and Famine
Rome Junior Conference on Macroeconomics
June 18, 2012
from 3:30 pm to 6:30 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events.
Rome Junior Conference on Macroeconomics
June 19, 2012
from 10:00 am to 5:00 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events.
Rome Junior Conference on Macroeconomics
June 20, 2012
from 11:45 am to 5:30 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events.
Summer Lecture: Guido Menzio - University of Pennsylvania
June 21, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Random and Directed Search Models of the Labor Market
Summer Lecture: Gur Huberman - Columbia University
June 21, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm
(1) Regulatory Forbearance in the Financial Crisis and Accounting; (2) Runs, on Banks and Otherwise
Summer Lecture: Guido Menzio - University of Pennsylvania
June 22, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Random and Directed Search Models of the Labor Market
Summer Lecture: Gur Huberman - Columbia University
June 22, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm
(1) Regulatory Forbearance in the Financial Crisis and Accounting; (2) Runs, on Banks and Otherwise
MOOD 2012: 12th Doctoral Workshop in Economic Theory and Econometrics
June 26, 2012
from 1:45 pm to 6:30 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events.
MOOD 2012: 12th Doctoral Workshop in Economic Theory and Econometrics
June 27, 2012
from 9:30 am to 6:00 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events.
MOOD 2012: 12th Doctoral Workshop in Economic Theory and Econometrics
June 28, 2012
from 9:30 am to 6:00 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events.
Summer Lecture: Massimo Morelli - Columbia University
July 2, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
(1) Natural Resources and Conflict; (2) Political Economy of Institutions
Summer Lecture: Marco Battaglini - Princeton University
July 2, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
The Political Economy of the Public Debt
Summer Lecture: Ariel Burstein - UCLA
July 2, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm
Facts and Models of International Relative Prices
Summer Lecture: Massimo Morelli - Columbia University
July 3, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
(1) Natural Resources and Conflict; (2) Political Economy of Institutions
Summer Lecture: Marco Battaglini - Princeton University
July 3, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
The Political Economy of the Public Debt
Summer Lecture: Ariel Burstein - UCLA
July 3, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm
Facts and Models of International Relative Prices
Summer Lecture: Vernon Henderson - Brown University
July 4, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm
Summer Lecture: Vernon Henderson - Brown University
July 5, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm
Summer Lecture: Raquel Fernandez - New York University
July 6, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Women’s Rights and Development
Summer Lecture: Georgy Egorov - Northwestern University
July 10, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
(1) Dynamics of Institutions; (2) Political Economy of Non-democracies
Summer Lecture: Hugo Hopenhayn - UCLA
July 10, 2012
from 11:30 am to 2:30 pm
Microstructure and Aggregate Productivity
Summer Lecture: Georgy Egorov - Northwestern University
July 11, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
(1) Dynamics of Institutions; (2) Political Economy of Non-democracies
Summer Lecture: Hugo Hopenhayn - UCLA
July 11, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Microstructure and Aggregate Productivity
CONSOB - EIEF Seminar: Patrick Bolton (Columbia University)
September 3, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
Cream Skimming in Financial Markets (with Tano Santos and Jose Scheinkman)
Yeon-Koo Che - Columbia University
September 5, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Credit Derivatives and the Cost of Capital
Lunch Seminar: Jan Brueckner - University of California, Irvine
September 6, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Workshop on “New Developments in Econometrics and Time Series”
September 10, 2012
from 8:30 am to 6:10 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events.
Fernando Alvarez - University of Chicago
September 10, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Workshop on “New Developments in Econometrics and Time Series”
September 11, 2012
from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events.
Lunch Seminar: Eli Berman - UC San Diego
September 12, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Efrem Castelnuovo - University of Padova
September 17, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Lubos Pastor - University of Chicago Booth School of Business
September 17, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Massimo Franchi - University of Rome “La Sapienza”
September 20, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Ed Nosal - Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
September 21, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Repo, Fire Sales and Bankruptcy Policy
Mark Huggett - Georgetown University
September 24, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Francesco Ravazzolo - Norges Bank
September 27, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Fabrizio Perri - University of Minnesota
October 1, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
The Geography of the Great Recession
Abstract:
This paper documents, using county level data, some geographical features of the US business cycle over the past 30 years, with particular focus on the Great Recession. It shows that county level unemployment rates are spatially dispersed and spatially correlated, and documents how these characteristics evolve during recessions. It then shows that some of these features of county data can be generated by a model which includes simple channels of transmission of economic conditions from a county to its neighbours. The model suggests that these local channels are quantitatively important for the amplification/muting of aggregate shocks.
Cristian Bartolucci - Collegio Carlo Alberto
October 4, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Dean Yang - University of Michigan
October 8, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Eli Berman - UC San Diego
October 10, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Christian Bayer - University of Bonn
October 11, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Nezih Guner - ICREA-MOVE, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE
October 15, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Livio Romano - European University Institute
October 17, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Alberto Bisin - NYU
October 18, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Alon Eizenberg - The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
October 18, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
CONSOB - EIEF Seminar: Ailsa Röell - School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
October 19, 2012
from 11:00 am to 12:30 pm
Hélène Rey - London Business School
October 22, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Harold Cole - University of Pennsylvania
October 24, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Otto Toivanen - Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
October 25, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Anatomy of Cartel Contracts
Abstract:
We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 Finnish cartels. One third of these clauses relate to raising profits. The remaining clauses deal with the instability of the cartel arrangement either through incentive compatibility, cartel organization, or external threats. Cartels use three approaches to raise profits: Price, market allocation, and specialization. These appear to be substitutes. Choosing one has implications on how they deal with instability. We find that industry- and cartel heterogeneity matters. The number of cartel members, the degree of product differentiation and industry- and macro-characteristics are all associated with contract choices.
Lunch Seminar: Daniele Massacci - University of Surrey & EIEF
October 26, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: William Zame - UCLA
October 29, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
David Levine - Washington University in St. Louis
October 29, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Lars Persson - Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm
October 31, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Acquisitions, Ownership Efficiency, and the Tax Shield of Debt
Abstract:
We show how the tax shield of debt can distort ownership efficiency in the market for corporate control. Firms with higher optimal leverage, but who are less efficient owners, can outbid more efficient owners of assets with lower optimal leverage. Policies to equalize the tax treatment of debt and equity (such as limits the tax shield of debt) can improve ownership efficiency and total welfare by weakening the connection between leverage and outcomes in acquisition contests. Alternatively, if the acquisition price is fully deductible, tax shields play no role because competitive bidding for assets generate sufficient non-debt deductions from the acquisition price alone to ensure bidders pay no taxes in equilibrium.
Dirk Niepelt - University of Bern
November 5, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Jan Eeckhout - Universitat Pompeu Fabra
November 6, 2012
from 3:00 pm to 4:30 pm
Mismatch and Unemployment Risk
Abstract:
Risk aversion is a natural source of mismatch. We consider sorting of workers with different asset holdings into jobs of varying productivity. In order to smooth consumption, job searchers choose the optimal bundle of wages and unemployment risk. Workers with low asset holdings direct their job search to low productivity firms because they offer low wage, low risk jobs. We show that this occurs under a necessary and sufficient condition closely related to Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion. Assets and productivities are complementary, but the sorting outcome is inefficient. Under complete information, the planner would like to reduce income inequality as well as unemployment risk. We also analyze the optimal mechanism when asset holdings are private information.
Lunch Seminar: Patrick Hürtgen - University of Bonn
November 8, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Sovereign default risk and state-dependent twin deficits
Abstract:
This paper studies government default in a small open economy model and shows that the propagation of economic shocks results in a state-dependent correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account. The model features two assets - private and public debt - where non-linear risk premia on government bonds arise endogenously when public debt is close to its fiscal limit, i.e. the maximum capacity of a country to repay its debt. Households internalize that the possibility of government default implies an increase in the dispersion of resulting tax levels leading to precautionary savings at high debt levels. The model is in line with empirical evidence that shows a decrease in the correlation of the twin deficits the higher is public debt.
Tarun Ramadorai - Saïd Business School, University of Oxford
November 8, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Do Stock Traders Learn From Experience? Evidence from an Emerging Market
Abstract:
This paper reports evidence that individual investors in Indian equities hold better performing portfolios as they become more experienced in the equity market. Several standard measures of investment mistakes, including underdiversification, high turnover, and the disposition effect, also decline with account age. These mistakes become less prevalent when investors experience poor returns resulting from them, consistent with models of reinforcement learning.
Lunch Seminar: Matthias Doepke - Northwestern University
November 9, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Christopher Hennessy - London Business School
November 12, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Stephen Wright - Bìrkbeck University of London
November 13, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Nicola Persico - Kellogg School of Management
November 15, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Tobias Kretschmer - Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
November 15, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Harald Uhlig - University of Chicago
November 19, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Valentina Corradi - University of Warwick
November 22, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Alberto Bennardo - University of Salerno
November 23, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Refet Gürkaynak - Bilkent University
November 26, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Judging the DSGE Model by Its Forecast
Abstract:
We study the forecasting ability of the standard estimated medium scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We show that although the model forecasts have lower root mean squared error compared to judgmental and statistical forecasts, the absolute forecasting ability is very poor. We argue that average forecasting ability during the Great Moderation is not a good metric to judge a model’s validity. We then offer alternative ways of using forecasts to judge the model. Importantly, we also highlight the importance of data and sample choices in the model’s forecasting ability. With the proper data treatment and choice of sample period when macroeconomic aggregates were indeed forecastable (pre-Great Moderation) the model provides a good forecasting performance.
Daniele Checchi (University of Milan)
November 29, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:00 pm
Nicola Pavoni - Bocconi University
December 3, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Efficient Child Care Subsidies (with Christine Ho, Singapore Management University)
Abstract:
We introduce household-provided child care in an optimal income taxation problem `a la Mirrlees. In our model, individuals have private information on effort cost and can devote part of their time to child care activities. We first characterize the constrained efficient allocation and propose an implementation that makes an efficiency case for child care subsidies on formal child care cost. Consistently with existing schemes, the optimal subsidies follow a sliding scale where higher child care subsidies are paid to lower income earners. We then calibrate our model to features of the US economy and focus on single mothers with children aged below 6. The optimal average subsidy rates are less generous than existing one, they range between 51% for low income earners decreasing to 5% for moderately low income earners and are nil for high and very high income earners.
Franc Klaassen - Universiteit van Amsterdam
December 10, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Francesco Bartolucci - University of Perugia
December 13, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Martin Uribe - Columbia University
December 17, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Carlo Cottarelli - IMF
December 19, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Roberto Robatto - University of Chicago
December 19, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Efraim Benmelech - Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
December 20, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Imran Rasul - University College London
December 20, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Lunch Seminar: Oriana Bandiera - London School of Economics
December 21, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Can basic entrepreneurship transform the economic lives of the poor?
Abstract:
This paper provides causal evidence on whether transferring capital and skills enables the most disadvantaged within a society to alter their occupational choices and exit poverty. We conduct a randomized evaluation of a program that provides assets and training to the poorest women in rural Bangladesh. We find that the program transforms the occupational choices of the poor - treated women spend 92% more hours running their new businesses and 26% less hours in wage employment. This shift from insecure wage labor to self-employment is associated with a 38% increase in earnings. Women, who were largely assetless and illiterate agricultural laborers at baseline, begin to close the gap with middle class women on dimensions such as occupational choice, regularity of earnings, household per capita expenditure and happiness. Inculcating basic entrepreneurship, where the most disadvantaged women take on business activities which hitherto had been the preserve of non-poor women, is shown to be a powerful means of transforming the economic lives of the poor.