Conference on “Il Risparmio degli Italiani: Sviluppo Economico e Tutela del Risparmiatore”
January 20, 2011
from 3:00 pm to 6:30 pm
For further details please see Workshops & Conferences.
January 20, 2011
from 3:00 pm to 6:30 pm
For further details please see Workshops & Conferences.
January 31, 2011
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
February 1, 2011
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
February 2, 2011
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
February 3, 2011
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
February 8, 2011
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
February 9, 2011
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
February 14, 2011
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
February 15, 2011
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
February 17, 2011
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
February 18, 2011
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
February 28, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
March 7, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
March 8, 2011
from 4:00 pm to 6:00 pm
March 9, 2011
from 4:00 pm to 6:00 pm
March 10, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
March 11, 2011
from 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm
March 14, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
March 21, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
March 24, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
March 25, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
March 25, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
March 28, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
March 30, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Abstract:
A field experiment (N = 113,047 participants) manipulated two factors in the sale of souvenir photos. First, some customers saw a traditional fixed price, whereas others could pay what they wanted (including $0). Second, approximately half of the customers saw a variation in which half of the revenue went to charity. At a standard fixed price, the charitable component only slightly increased demand, as similar studies have also found. However, when participants could pay what they wanted, the same charitable component created a treatment that was substantially more profitable. Switching from corporate social responsibility to what we term shared social responsibility works in part because customized contributions allow customers to directly express social welfare concerns through the purchasing of material goods.
March 31, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
April 4, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Abstract:
We show that U.S. inflation depends more on the future than on the past in a range of estimated macroeconomic models. This non-causality result is problematic for macroeconomists trained in causal models, since they assume by definition that inflation only depends on current shocks and past information. Even models with rational forward-looking agents are causal as expectations are themselves only a function of the past. Our finding that U.S. inflation data prefers time to run backwards suggests that the models we estimate are misspecified. The focus of this paper is the econometrician’s information set. We show that inflation depends more on the future than the past if the information set of the econometrician does not span that of firms in the economy. To combat this missing variable problem we expand the information set of the econometrician to include measures of the output gap, interest rates, and factors identified as principal components of a large dataset of economic indicators. The resulting Phillips curve and factor-augmented vector autoregression models still show strong dependency of U.S. inflation on the future. We therefore conclude that non-causal inflation is pervasive and firms know a lot more about the future than we typically assume.
April 7, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
April 8, 2011
from 10:00 am to 1:00 pm
April 11, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Risk vs. Social Preferences
April 12, 2011
from 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm
April 14, 2011
from 4:00 pm to 6:00 pm
April 14, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
April 18, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
April 21, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Investing in Schooling in Chile: The Role of Information about Financial Aid for Higher Education
April 28, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
May 2, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
May 2, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
May 5, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
May 9, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Selection Effects in Insurance Markets with Unobservable Types
ABSTRACT:
A number of empirical studies of insurance markets have found nega- tive risk-coverage correlation, and named this phenomenon advantageous selection. An explanation of this puzzle is the existence of multiple sources of private infor- mation. Understanding the structure of private information is key for assessing the operating of insurance markets. In this paper we analyze selection effects by modeling a finite number of heterogeneous types, and using recent advances in finite mixture modeling, we discuss how risk and coverage probabilities can be identified and estimated for the unobserved types. These estimates can be used to test for selection effects, to give an approximate measure of the relative welfare loss from private information, and for policy analysis. To show the applicability of our approach, we look at the US long-term care and Medigap insurance markets. In both markets we find that there is significant evidence of residual heterogeneity, that the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz adverse selection model is not supported by the data, and private information causes significant inefficiency, especially in the heavily regulated Medigap market.
May 9, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
May 12, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
May 13, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Fiscal Policy Challenges and Sovereign Default in Advanced Economies
May 16, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
May 19, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Demand and Supply Effects in the Determination of Firm Performance
May 19, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
May 23, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
May 23, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
May 25, 2011
from 2:00 pm to 5:00 pm
The Equity Premium: Why Is It a Puzzle
May 26, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
May 30, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Credit Market Competition and Interbank Liquidity (joint with Agnese Leonello)
Abstract
We develop a model in which credit market competition affects banks’ liquidity holdings and thus financial stability. Banks can trade loans on the interbank market to satisfy their stochastic liquidity demands. Two types of equilibria exist. In the no default equilibrium, banks keep enough reserves and do not default. In the mixed equilibrium, banks trade loans on the interbank market and some default with positive probability. The existence of these equilibria depends on the degree of credit market competition. We show that when competition is intense, only the no default equilibrium exists. When it is not, only the mixed equilibrium exists. Thus, competition is detrimental to financial stability.
May 31, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
June 6, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
June 6, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Equilibrium Intermediation and Resource Allocation With a Frictional Credit Market
June 9, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
News Shocks and the Term Structure of Interest Rates: a Challenge for DSGE Models (joint with Chris Otrok, University of Virginia)
Abstract:
News shocks about future increases in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) lead to a large and persistent drop in inflation and the Federal Funds rate while driving up the slope of the term structure of interest rates (Kurmann and Otrok, 2010). In this paper, we first show that a monetary DSGE model with a standard parametrization along the lines of Smets and Wouters (2007) is unable to replicate these dynamics. We then formally estimate the model with a limited-information procedure that is designed to match as closely as possible the impulse responses of key macroeconomic aggregates, inflation and the term structure to TFP news shocks. When we restrict parameters to economically meaningful values, the model is unable to generate the large drop in inflation and the Federal Funds rate that causes the slope of the term structure to increase. This failure to quantitatively account for the impact of TFP news shocks represents a challenge for modern DSGE models because TFP news shocks explain a significant portion of the variation in inflation, the Federal Funds rate and the term structure of interest rate as well as medium-run fluctuations in future real activity.
June 9, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
June 13, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Contracts
June 13, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
June 14, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Contracts
June 15, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Aggregate effect of monetary shocks in sticky price models based on fixed menu cost
June 15, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
The Political Economy of Public Debt
June 15, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Aiding Conflict: The Unintended Consequences of U.S. Food Aid on Conflict
June 16, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Aggregate effect of monetary shocks in sticky price models based on fixed menu cost
June 16, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
The Political Economy of Public Debt
June 17, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Principles of Optimal Taxation
June 17, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Bank Type and Lending to ‘Good’ Firms at Difficult Times: Evidence from the Current Crisis
Abstract:
This paper investigates empirically the link between bank type (size) and the ability to lend to ‘good’ firms. By ‘good’ firms we mean those with good economic fundamentals and prospects, proxied by TFP. The ability of the banking sector to allocate capital efficiently along this dimension has not been investigated in the literature. We document that TFP helps to predict firm’s profitability. Our analysis focuses on the 6-month period after Lehman, when credit availability became key for the survival of economically-sound firms in financial trouble. By using data at the bank-firm level for Italy, we document that the response of credit supply to borrowers’ economic fundamentals was significantly stronger for the largest banking groups than for smaller banks. These results are strengthened for the subsample of firms that were undergoing financial difficulties as reflected by bad credit scores.
June 20, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Principles of Optimal Taxation
June 20, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Dynamic theoretical models in political economy
June 20, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
June 20, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
June 21, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Dynamic theoretical models in political economy
June 22, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Models that combine heterogeneous producers (entrepreneurs) and financial frictions
June 22, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Culture and Economics
June 22, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Civic Capital and Democracy in the Long-run
June 23, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Models that combine heterogeneous producers (entrepreneurs) and financial frictions
June 23, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Culture as Learning
June 24, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Competing for Customers: A Search Model of the Market for Unsecured Credit (joint with Lukasz Drozd)
June 27, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Models (and data) of unsecured borrowing default under incomplete markets
June 27, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Traditional and Shadow Banking
June 27, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
ABC on Deals (with Maros Servatka & Radovan Vadovic)
Abstract:
We propose a framework for analyzing agreements in strategic settings, be they informal or binding. We then develop, and experimentally test, a specific model formulated within the framework.
June 28, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Models (and data) of unsecured borrowing default under incomplete markets
June 28, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Traditional and Shadow Banking
June 28, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Women’s Rights and Development
June 30, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Models of innovation, firm dynamics, and international trade
June 30, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Liquidity Effects in the U.S. Corporate Bond Market
June 30, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
The Optimum Quantity of Money with Borrowing Constraints (joint with Francesco Lippi)
July 1, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Models of innovation, firm dynamics, and international trade
July 1, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Liquidity Effects in the U.S. Corporate Bond Market
July 1, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Revolution and Industrialization in Russia through the Lens of Neoclassical Growth Theory (joint with Anton Cheremukhin, Sergei Guriev and Aleh Tsyvinski)
July 4, 2011
from 3:00 pm to 6:00 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events.
July 5, 2011
from 9:00 am to 6:00 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events.
July 6, 2011
from 9:00 am to 6:00 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events.
July 7, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Firm Microstructure and Aggregate Productivity
July 7, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Information Aggregation and Transmission
July 7, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Relationship Lending in a Financial Turmoil
July 8, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Firm Microstructure and Aggregate Productivity
July 8, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Information Aggregation and Transmission
July 8, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
The Great Escape? A Quantitative Evaluation of the Fed’s Non-Standard Policies
July 11, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Commercial Imperialism? CIA Interventions and Trade During the Cold War
July 11, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Reallocation and Productivity
July 12, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Trade and inequality
July 12, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Psychological Games: Theory & Experiments
July 12, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Idea Flows, Economic Growth, and Trade
July 13, 2011
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Trade and inequality
July 13, 2011
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm
Experimental Asset Markets
July 13, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
The Free Rider Problem: a Dynamic Analysis
July 14, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
July 15, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Persistent Liquidity Effect and Long Run Money Demand
July 18, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Importing Skill Biased Technology
July 20, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Conflict in Sequential Innovation
July 22, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
On the Voluntary Exchange of Favors
July 26, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Wealth and Volatility
July 27, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Germs, Social Network and Growth
July 29, 2011
from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Incomplete Information and Menu Costs
September 1, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Information Insensitive Securities: the Benefits of Central Counterparties
September 12, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
September 22, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Resuscitating Long-run Restrictions
September 26, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
September 29, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
September 30, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
The Causal Effect of Bankruptcy Law on the Cost of Finance
October 3, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
October 3, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
October 4, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
October 5, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
October 6, 2011
from 9:00 am to 6:00 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events.
October 7, 2011
from 9:00 am to 6:00 pm
For further details, please see Scientific Events.
October 10, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
October 11, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
October 12, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
October 13, 2011
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm
Wages, Employment, and Trade
October 14, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Rational Inattention, Multi-Product Firms, and the Neutrality of Money
October 17, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
October 17, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
October 18, 2011
from 9:30 am to 1:00 pm
October 18, 2011
from 2:30 pm to 4:00 pm
October 19, 2011
from 9:30 am to 1:00 pm
October 19, 2011
from 2:30 pm to 4:00 pm
October 20, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
October 20, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
October 24, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
October 27, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Household Saving through Recessions and Crises
October 31, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
November 2, 2011
from 11:00 am to 1:00 pm
Experimental Economics
November 2, 2011
from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm
Experimental Economics
November 3, 2011
from 11:00 am to 1:00 pm
Experimental Economics
November 3, 2011
from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm
Experimental Economics
November 3, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:00 pm
November 7, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
November 8, 2011
from 12:00 pm to 1:00 pm
November 9, 2011
from 11:00 am to 1:00 pm
November 9, 2011
from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm
November 10, 2011
from 11:00 am to 1:00 pm
November 10, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Price and Brand Competition between Differentiated Retailers: A Structural Econometric Model
November 11, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
November 14, 2011
from 11:00 am to 1:00 pm
November 14, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Judicial Efficiency and Financial Contracts: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Abstract:
We exploit a 2004 credit reform in Brazil that simplied the selling of repossessed cars used as collateral for auto loans. We show that the legal change has led to loans with lower spreads, longer maturities, and higher leverage. The reform brought about an expansion of credit, enabling riskier low-income borrowers to obtain loans and purchase newer, more expensive cars. Although the credit reform improved access to credit, by expanding credit to riskier borrowers, it also led to increased incidences of default and repossession. In sum, we provide evidence on the consequences of a credit reform, highlighting the crucial role that collateral plays in credit markets.
November 14, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
November 15, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
November 17, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
November 21, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
November 24, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle
Paper 1: Heterogeneity and Behavioral Responses to Unemployment Benefits over the Business Cycle
Paper 2: Optimal Unemployment Insurance over the Business Cycle
November 25, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Political Risk and International Valuation
November 28, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
December 1, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
December 5, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
Dynamic Bargaining over Redistribution in Legislatures
December 9, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Advertising and the Welfare Implications of Endogenous Preferences
December 12, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm
December 15, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
Pricing and Incentives in Publicly Subsidized Health Care Markets: the Case of Medicare Part D
December 15, 2011
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
December 19, 2011
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm
December 19, 2011
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm