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Lunch Seminar: Ganna Pogrebna - Warwick University
Wednesday 04 March 2015, 01:00pm - 02:00pm

Are Donors Afraid of Charities’ Core Costs? Scale Economies in Non-profit Provisionand Charity Selection

Abstract: 

We study contestability in non-profit markets where non-commercial providers supply a homogeneous collective good through increasing-returns-to-scale technologies. Unlike in the case of for-profit competition, in the non-profit case the absence of price-based sales contracts means that fixed costs are directly relevant to donors, and that they can translate into an entry barrier, protecting the position of an inefficient incumbent; or that, conversely, they can make it possible for inefficient newcomers to contest the position of a more efficient incumbent. Evidence from laboratory experiments show that fixed cost driven trade-offs between payoff dominance and perceived risk can lead to inefficient selection.

   
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