Trade-offs in Repugnant Transactions: A Choice Experiment (with Julio Elias and Mario Macis)

Abstract:
Societies prohibit many transactions considered morally repugnant, although potentially efficiency-enhancing. We conduct an online choice experiment to characterize preferences for the morality and efficiency of payments to kidney donors. The survey elicits opinions on several moral issues about allowing payments, shows different hypothetical supply effects of compensating donors, and asks respondents to express their support for different types of kidney procurement and allocation systems that would include compensation. Although choices are based on hypotheticals, we design the survey to include elements of consequentiality and incentive compatibility. Through this experiment we are able to assess whether cost-benefit considerations affect the acceptance of morally controversial transactions. The analysis also provides insights to policymakers about the role of empirical evidence about the effects of compensation for kidney donors in informing the public debate.