

# High Frequency Traders: Taking Advantage of Speed

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Joint work with Yacine Aït-Sahalia (Princeton).

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# Stylized Facts and Motivation

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- Cancel orders with high probability [Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009].


**Question:** What could be the driver of this behavior?

# Our Contributions


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- We derive the HFT's optimal **liquidity provision** in a dynamic model as a function of his speed, asset volatility in monopolistic and duopolistic markets.
- Our model reproduces endogenous **cancellation** of limit orders.
- We evaluate various recent proposals to **regulate** high-frequency trading.


# Limit Order Book



# Simplified Limit Order Book




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


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- Bid-offer spread is given by  $C$ .
- The LFTs submit market orders which arrive at random times according to a Poisson process with parameter  $\lambda$ .

# Trading Technology of HFTs

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- HFT receives a signal  $s$  with rate  $\mu$  which is informative about the sign of the incoming market order.
  - ⇒ Signals can be generated from **hard information**
    - order book imbalance
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
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- The signal is an iid Bernoulli random variable,  $s \in \{\text{sell}, \text{buy}\}$  with each being equally likely.
- Conditional on **buy (sell)** signal the next market order will be a **sell (buy)** order with probability  $p$  and **buy (sell)** with probability  $1 - p$ .


# HFT's Quoting Mechanism

- The HFT makes quoting decisions immediately after observing a signal or market order.
- The HFT can post limit orders at the best bid ( $\ell^b = 1$ ) and/or the best ask price ( $\ell^a = 1$ ).
- The quantity is fixed at 1 lot: no optimization over quantity. The number of possible actions is 4:



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
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
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- With  $T_i^s$  the  $i$ th market sell order and  $T_j^b$  the  $j$ th market buy order, the HFT maximizes over any feasible  $\pi$  that chooses  $\ell^b$  and  $\ell^a$  at decision times:

$$\max_{\pi} \mathbb{E}^{\pi} \left[ \frac{C}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} e^{-DT_i^{\text{sell}}} \mathbb{1} \left( \ell_{T_i^{\text{sell}}}^b = 1 \right) + \frac{C}{2} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} e^{-DT_j^{\text{buy}}} \mathbb{1} \left( \ell_{T_j^{\text{buy}}}^a = 1 \right) - \Gamma \int_0^{\infty} e^{-Dt} |x_t| dt \right]$$

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- The corresponding action at each state is whether to quote a limit order or not at the best bid and best ask, i.e.,  $\ell^b \in \{0, 1\}$  and  $\ell^a \in \{0, 1\}$ .





# Optimal Market Making Policy

- The optimal quoting policy of the HFT,  $\pi^*$ , consists in quoting at the best bid and the ask according to a **threshold** policy.
- We prove that there exists  $L^*$  and  $U^*$  with  $-L^* \geq U^*$  such that


$$\ell^{b*}(x, 1) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x < U^* \\ 0 & \text{if } x \geq U^* \end{cases} \quad \ell^{a*}(x, 1) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x > L^* \\ 0 & \text{if } x \leq L^* \end{cases}$$

$$\ell^{b*}(x, -1) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x < -L^* \\ 0 & \text{if } x \geq -L^* \end{cases} \quad \ell^{a*}(x, -1) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x > -U^* \\ 0 & \text{if } x \leq -U^* \end{cases}$$


# Interpretation




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
Buy




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
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
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
Buy




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
Buy



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


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





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
Sell



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


# Illustration: A Simulated Path




# Comparative Statics


# Arrival Rate of the Signal: $\mu$




# Arrival Rate of the Signal: $\mu$



## Arrival Rate of the LFTs: $\lambda$



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
# Implications for the Market Structure

# Implications from stationary probabilities


- Inventory fluctuates between  $[L, -L]$ .
- Signals can take values from  $\{-1, 1\}$ .
- Under optimal policy, we have a finite state irreducible Markov Chain.
- Long-run stationary probabilities,  $\pi(x, s)$ , exist.
- Long-run probability of quoting at both sides of the market can be found by

$$q_{\text{quote}} = \sum_{x \in (L, U)} \pi(x, 1) + \sum_{x \in (-U, -L)} \pi(x, -1).$$


# HFT's Liquidity Provision



## Welfare of the LFTs: Fill Rate



# Cancellation Rates



# Price Volatility

- Let the fundamental price of the security,  $S_t$ , be specified by a pure jump process


$$S_t = S_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{N_t} Y_i,$$

- $N_t$  is a Poisson process with arrival rate  $\zeta$  counting the number of tick movements up to time  $t$  and  $Y_i$  is the jump size with


$$Y_i \sim \begin{cases} J & \text{with probability } \frac{1}{2}, \\ -J & \text{with probability } \frac{1}{2}. \end{cases}$$

- When the price jump occurs, an LFT may arrive and possibly trade with a stale HFT quote, effectively imposing **adverse selection** on the HFT.

# Illustration: Volatility Model




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





# Impact of Volatility on HFT's Profits




# Impact of Volatility on HFT's Quoting Policy



# Impact of Volatility on Welfare of the LFTs




# Duopoly Model - Priority Issues




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
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


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- Our model can accommodate priority issues with additional states.

# Impact of Competition on HFT's Profits



# Impact of Competition on Liquidity






# Policy Implications


# Discussion of Highly Cited Policies

- **Tobin Tax:** Suppose that HFT pays  $\frac{\kappa}{2}$  dollars each time for every trade.
  - Equivalent to changing the spread in our model. Define the tax-adjusted bid-offer spread as  $\tilde{C} \equiv C - \kappa$ .
- **Speed Bumps for HFTs:** We can impose (random) minimum time before a quote can be cancelled.
  - Random minimum time limits can be modeled using another Poisson clock with rate  $\theta$ . Lower  $\theta$  imposes larger order resting times.
- **Cancellation Taxes:** We can tax the HFT by  $\varepsilon$  dollars whenever he cancels an existing quote.
  - This extension can be accommodated via additional states that keeps track of the previous quotes.


# Tobin Tax decreases HFT's Objective Value




# Tobin Tax hurts Liquidity




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
# Sensitivity to Volatility



# Resting Time decreases HFT's Objective Value




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





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
# Downside: Countercyclical with Volatility




# Cancellation Tax decreases HFT's Objective Value




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# Conclusion

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- Model is very **tractable** and allows multiple extensions with interesting research questions.

## Key implications:

- HFTs improve market liquidity but they shy away providing liquidity in high volatility regimes.
- Tobin tax is a **bad** policy for the market but minimum time limits and cancellation taxes can improve liquidity.