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UID:7baf7b52de6ad1aeea4b64ca0b405648
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20260612T122430
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Silvia Vannutelli (Northwestern University) and Maddalena Ronchi (Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University)
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nThe Value of Information for Regulatory Enforcement\n\n\nAbstract:\nReg
 ulatory enforcement often depends on information produced by agents who may
  have incentives to distort it. We study this tension in the context of the
  Italian Court of Auditors, where local public finance auditors report
  to national judges. We model this process as involving two frictions:
  imperfect detection of irregularities and incentives to underreport them. 
 A reform that randomized auditor assignments provides a natural experi
 ment that potentially increasesthe first friction (by reducing local knowle
 dge) while reducing the second one (by increasingindependence). Combining n
 ovel administrative data with a machine-learning-based measureof fiscal ris
 k, we find that enforcement increased and became better targeted toward hig
 h-risk municipalities. We trace this improvement to the transmission c
 hannel: randomly assigned auditors report more irregularities, especia
 lly in high-risk municipalities and where pre-reform local ties were s
 trongest. Experienced judges translate these improved signals into enforcem
 ent, concentrating deliberations on high-risk cases. The results suggest th
 at in this setting,the benefits of auditor independence dominate the costs 
 of reduced local knowledge. \n
DTSTAMP:20260612T185403Z
DTSTART:20260618T130000Z
DTEND:20260618T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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