BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:7951dbfb056d595bcb84996064c59633
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20250626T063525
SUMMARY:Marco Bassetto - Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p><em><strong><a href="https://m-bassetto.github.io/research/ukvsarg/Publi
 c_Debt_Domestic_Currency.pdf">The Role of Dispersed Information in Maintain
 ing Low Interest Rates</a>, joint work with Carlo Galli (Universidad Carlos
  III, Madrid) and Jason Hall (University of Minnesota)</strong></em></p><p>
 Abstract:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When public debt is issued in 
 domestic currency, any sudden confidence crisis in the repayment ability of
  the government need not trigger a default, since it can be accommodated by
  temporary monetary financing, converting default risk into inflation risk.
  When the default risk premium is determined by well-informed financial int
 ermediaries while inflation arises from the choices of less-informed worker
 s and producers, this conversion masks adverse news, at least temporarily, 
 and results in lower interest rates following adverse shocks. In this paper
 , we assess the quantitative importance of this channel, and the extent by 
 which it is eroded when persistent fiscal shortfalls shift the prior held b
 y all agents in the economy about the eventual resolution of the imbalance.
 </p>
DTSTAMP:20260429T054651Z
DTSTART:20251209T163000Z
DTEND:20251209T180000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR