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UID:2e9a7a74e0576d48e64ea5aa31fca07d
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20241025T084809
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Matthew Johnson - Duke University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nInnovation and the Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements\n\n\nAbstrac
 t:\nNoncompete Agreements (NCAs) are a common way that firms restrict worke
 rs' mobility, potentially contributing to declining business dynamism. Anal
 yzing state-level law changes, we find that making NCAs easier to enforce (
 "stricter" enforceability) leads to fewer patents, an effect that we s
 how reflects a loss in innovation. While stricter enforceability encourages
  firms' R&D investment, consistent with alleviating hold-up concerns, i
 t also limits inventors' job mobility and new business formation, slowing k
 nowledge diffusion. Supplementary tests corroborate that the decline in mob
 ility at least partially drives the decline in innovation. Variation in tec
 hnology classes’ exposure to NCA enforceability reveals that our state-leve
 l estimates, if anything, underestimate the economywide impact of NCAs on i
 nnovation.\n
DTSTAMP:20260423T021229Z
DTSTART:20241030T130000Z
DTEND:20241030T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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