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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:2e9a7a74e0576d48e64ea5aa31fca07d
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20241025T084809
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Matthew Johnson - Duke University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p><em><strong>Innovation and the Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements</
 strong></em></p><p>Abstract:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Noncompete 
 Agreements (NCAs) are a common way that firms restrict workers' mobility, p
 otentially contributing to declining business dynamism. Analyzing state-lev
 el law changes, we find that making NCAs easier to enforce ("stricter"&nbsp
 ;enforceability) leads to fewer patents, an effect that we show reflects a 
 loss in innovation. While stricter enforceability encourages firms' R&amp;D
  investment, consistent with alleviating hold-up concerns, it also limits i
 nventors' job mobility and new business formation, slowing knowledge diffus
 ion. Supplementary tests corroborate that the decline in mobility at least 
 partially drives the decline in innovation. Variation in technology classes
 ’ exposure to NCA enforceability reveals that our state-level estimates, if
  anything, underestimate the economywide impact of NCAs on innovation.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260423T021448Z
DTSTART:20241030T130000Z
DTEND:20241030T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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