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UID:7793c91b8920c35e13d86678ecc86266
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20240516T111204
SUMMARY:Peter Koudijs - Erasmus University Rotterdam
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nLiability, Risk and Bank Failure\n\n\nAbstract:\nDoes enhanced sharehol
 der and manager liability reduce bank risk-taking and failure? We compare t
 he performance of around 4,200 state-regulated banks of similar size in nei
 ghboring U.S. states with different liability regimes before and during the
  Great Depression. Limited liability banks took more risk during the 1920s 
 and their distress rate was 29% higher than that of banks with enhanced lia
 bility. Results are robust to a diff-in-diff analysis incorporating nationa
 lly-regulated banks (that faced the same regulations everywhere) and are no
 t driven by other differences in state regulations, Fed membership, local c
 haracteristics, or differential selection into state-regulated banks. Our r
 esults suggest that exposing shareholders and managers to more downside ris
 k successfully reduces bank risk-taking and failure. \n
DTSTAMP:20260423T021257Z
DTSTART:20241024T163000Z
DTEND:20241024T180000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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