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UID:7793c91b8920c35e13d86678ecc86266
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20240516T111204
SUMMARY:Peter Koudijs - Erasmus University Rotterdam
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p><strong>Liability, Risk and Bank Failure</strong></p><p><strong>Abstract
 :</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Does enhanced shareholder and
  manager liability reduce bank risk-taking and failure? We compare the perf
 ormance of around 4,200 state-regulated banks of similar size in neighborin
 g U.S. states with different liability regimes before and during the Great 
 Depression. Limited liability banks took more risk during the 1920s and the
 ir distress rate was 29% higher than that of banks with enhanced liability.
  Results are robust to a diff-in-diff analysis incorporating nationally-reg
 ulated banks (that faced the same regulations everywhere) and are not drive
 n by other differences in state regulations, Fed membership, local characte
 ristics, or differential selection into state-regulated banks. Our results 
 suggest that exposing shareholders and managers to more downside risk succe
 ssfully reduces bank risk-taking and failure.&nbsp;</p>
DTSTAMP:20260423T021549Z
DTSTART:20241024T163000Z
DTEND:20241024T180000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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