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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:30c9170a16a84e23a5e72d70bbbe2794
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20240513T061330
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Roberto Saitto - Stanford University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nAs-if Dominant Strategy Mechanisms\n\n\nAbstract:\nWe show that achievi
 ng dominant strategy incentive compatibility often requires a designer to c
 hoose a mechanism of severely limited transparency. To allow for greater tr
 ansparency while maintaining straightforward strategic incentives we propos
 e as-if dominant strategy mechanisms,  defined as follows. As long as 
 all agents believe others play as if they were in a static mechanism: (i) E
 ach of them has a strategy that is optimal no matter what others do, and (i
 i) rationality alone is enough to ensure that they always best respond to e
 ach other. We show that the auction format used by prominent online platfor
 ms---such as eBay---achieves maximal transparency within the set of as-if d
 ominant strategy second-price auctions with asynchronous bids. Furthermore,
  we provide a unified explanation for experimental findings in a range of s
 ettings, from matching to multi-unit auctions environments. Finally, we sho
 w that mechanisms satisfying a refinement of as-if dominance are also solva
 ble by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. \n
DTSTAMP:20260522T104959Z
DTSTART:20240620T130000Z
DTEND:20240620T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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