BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:cf24c26307f8a0eae88123940d6f0a14
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20240423T060634
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Daniele Terlizzese - EIEF
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nWhen is Trust Robust?\n\n\nAbstract:\nWe examine an economy in which in
 teractions are more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from c
 heating. Some agents are scoundrels, who always cheat, while others cheat o
 nly if the cost of cheating, a decreasing function of the proportion of che
 aters, is sufficiently low. The economy exhibits multiple equilibria. As th
 e proportion of scoundrels in the economy declines, the high-trust equilibr
 ium can be by arbitrarily small perturbations or infusions of low-trust age
 nts, while the low-trust equilibrium becomes impervious to perturbations an
 d infusions of high-trust agents. The resilience of trust may thus hinge up
 on the prevalence of scoundrels.\n
DTSTAMP:20260617T075829Z
DTSTART:20240510T130000Z
DTEND:20240510T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR