BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:cf24c26307f8a0eae88123940d6f0a14
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20240423T060634
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Daniele Terlizzese - EIEF
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p><em><strong>When is Trust Robust?</strong></em></p><p>Abstract:</p><p st
 yle="text-align: justify;">We examine an economy in which interactions are 
 more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from cheating. Some a
 gents are scoundrels, who always cheat, while others cheat only if the cost
  of cheating, a decreasing function of the proportion of cheaters, is suffi
 ciently low. The economy exhibits multiple equilibria. As the proportion of
  scoundrels in the economy declines, the high-trust equilibrium can be by a
 rbitrarily small perturbations or infusions of low-trust agents, while the 
 low-trust equilibrium becomes impervious to perturbations and infusions of 
 high-trust agents. The resilience of trust may thus hinge upon the prevalen
 ce of scoundrels.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260617T083648Z
DTSTART:20240510T130000Z
DTEND:20240510T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR