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UID:d47bd54921f922d0e85b3719c60862dc
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20231212T092549
SUMMARY:Federico Trombetta - Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nJumping without parachutes. Revolving doors and political incentives\n\
 n\nAbstract:\nWe explore the impact of connections between politics and bus
 iness on the profile of political candidates and on their policy decisions.
  Specifically, we examine the effects of anti-revolving door laws, which en
 force a waiting period (``cooling-off'') before former politicians can hold
  significant roles in the bureaucracy or in state-owned enterprises. We bui
 ld a political agency model with endogenous selection into politics where t
 hose ``politically connected outside options'' (PCOs) are available to poli
 ticians. We show that a reduction in their expected value is relatively mor
 e costly for candidates with a lower human capital, thus it increases the s
 hare of high human capital candidates. At the same time, it increases the l
 ikelihood of equilibria where low human capital politicians choose to pande
 r toward the voters' prior. Empirically, we test those predictions using It
 alian municipality-level data. We exploit a population threshold in the app
 lication of an anti-revolving door policy that introduces a cooling-off per
 iod. Using a difference-in-discontinuity approach, we show that the cooling
 -off period increases the average education of candidates and elected mayor
 s. We also show that the reform reduces the incentives to choose policies t
 hat may be electorally costly, but only for low human capital mayors.\n
DTSTAMP:20260408T151339Z
DTSTART:20240314T143000Z
DTEND:20240314T160000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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