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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:d62c551e44da6113196763ccad088023
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20260624T091244
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Zhen Zhou - Tsinghua University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Collective Contracting for Coordination\n\n\nAbstract:\nThe success of a te
 am project requires multiple agents to participate and exert effort. Beyond
  the classical single-agent moral hazard problem, strategic complementarity
  introduces two sources of strategic risk: agents may shirk because they fe
 ar others will shirk, or decline to participate because they fear others wi
 ll not join. A principal seeks to design contracts that guarantee full part
 icipation and effort. We introduce collective contracts, under which each a
 gent's reward depends not only on the project outcome but also on the parti
 cipation profile. We show that, under the optimal collective contract, the 
 principal can implement her desired outcome without paying any incentive re
 nt associated with strategic risk. The two sources of strategic risk are re
 solved by two distinct mechanisms: a sufficiently attractive outside option
  triggers forward-induction reasoning, ensuring that any agent who accepts 
 the contract must exert effort; and conditioning rewards on the participati
 on profile guarantees participation as the collective contract protects eac
 h agent's outside option even if others reject the contract. The optimal co
 llective contract takes the form of an all-or-nothing mechanism, under whic
 h any single agent's rejection effectively voids the participation of the o
 thers. We further compare our findings with Winter (2004) and Halac, Lipnow
 ski, and Rappoport (2021), and discuss applications including syndicated lo
 ans and venture-capital fundraising.\n
DTSTAMP:20260711T051616Z
DTSTART:20260714T130000Z
DTEND:20260714T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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