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UID:067194a7e6171fbb5e38a163ac21232d
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20211019T092532
SUMMARY:Eloisa Campioni - Università di Roma "Tor Vergata"
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms
  ”, with Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and Alessandro Pavan\n \n Abstract:
  \nWe study games in which several principals contract with several private
 ly-informed agents. We show that enabling the principals to engage in contr
 actible private disclosures (by sending private signals to the agents about
  how the mechanisms will respond to the agents’ messages) can significantly
  affect the predictions of such games. Our first result shows that equilibr
 ium outcomes and payoffs of games without private disclosures need not be s
 ustainable when private disclosures are allowed. The result thus challenges
  the robustness of the "folk theorems" of Yamashita (2010) and Peters and T
 roncoso-Valverde (2013). Our second result shows that private disclosures m
 ay generate equilibrium outcomes that cannot be supported in any game witho
 ut private disclosures, no matter the richness of the message spaces and th
 e availability of public randomizing devices. The result thus challenges th
 e canonicity of the universal mechanisms of Epstein and Peters (1999). Thes
 e findings call for a novel approach to the analysis of competing-mechanism
  games.\n
DTSTAMP:20260711T061200Z
DTSTART:20211129T163000Z
DTEND:20211129T180000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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