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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:57960b57c50b8dc64da8cd8842e78e7f
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20180507T122920
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Rahul Deb - University of Toronto
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p><strong><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Calibri','sans-serif
 ';">Compromising Quality to Stay Relevant</span></strong><span style="font-
 size: 11pt; font-family: 'Calibri','sans-serif';"> (joint with Matt Mitchel
 l and Mallesh Pai). </span></p><p><strong><span style="font-size: 11pt; fon
 t-family: 'Calibri','sans-serif';">Abstract:</span></strong></p><p style="t
 ext-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Calibri','
 sans-serif';">We study a novel dynamic principal-agent framework which feat
 ures adverse selection, moral hazard and no transfers. The model can be des
 cribed as a bandit problem where the principal chooses between a safe and r
 isky arm, whose type is known and whose output is controlled by a strategic
  agent. The principal prefers to pull the risky arm only if it is the high 
 type whereas, irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize the number 
 of times it is pulled. Our main result shows that when the principal can co
 mmit, there are conditions under which the optimal dynamic mechanism induce
 s efficient output from the risky arm. By contrast, in the absence of commi
 tment, inefficient output must arise on path in all equilibria (subject to 
 a mild refinement). We use our model to discuss reputation management by on
 line content providers and by experts in organizations.</span></p>
DTSTAMP:20260406T174503Z
DTSTART:20180516T130000Z
DTEND:20180516T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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