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VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:89a59a56ec2e9b7ad92bef800710b410
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20180424T155406
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Jeffrey Ely - Northwestern University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><strong><span style="f
 ont-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Calibri','sans-serif';">Sequential Informatio
 n Design</span></strong><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Calibri
 ','sans-serif';"> (joint with Laura Doval)</span></p><p style="margin-botto
 m: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><strong><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-f
 amily: 'Calibri','sans-serif';">Abstract:</span></strong><span style="font-
 size: 11pt; font-family: 'Calibri','sans-serif';"><br /> We study games of 
 incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive-
 form vary.  An analyst may know the payoff-relevant data but not the player
 s' private information, nor the extenstive-form that governs their play.  A
 lternatively, a  designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingre
 dients.  We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of s
 ome extensive-form with some information structure.  </span></p>
DTSTAMP:20260407T044534Z
DTSTART:20180613T130000Z
DTEND:20180613T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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