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UID:25641a56432fff2a78ed9fb6df2faee2
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20180126T140100
SUMMARY:Andrea Mattozzi - European University Institute
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p><strong>Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment</strong> (joint with David K.
  Levine)</p><p><strong>Abstract:</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;
 ">We introduce a model of turnout where social norms, strategically chosen 
 by competing political parties, determine voters' turnout. Social norms mus
 t be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost 
 of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantage
 d. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advan
 taged. Our model shares features of the “ethical” voter model and it delive
 rs novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260406T174438Z
DTSTART:20180528T163000Z
DTEND:20180528T180000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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