Great Expectations: The Persistent Effect of Origin Institutions on Immigrants’ Political Trust
Abstract:
This research explore
s the forces behind the formation and the transmission of immigrants’ polit
ical trust and highlights the differences with respect to interpersonal tru
st. First, it theoretically and empirically establishes that immigrants com
ing from corrupt countries, tend to overtrust the institutions at the host
country. This inflated trust of immigrants is documented as the Great Expec
tations effect. Second, the analysis explores whether political trust is sh
aped primarily by mean attitudes and/or by average institutional quality (b
oth at the origin country). Interestingly, the findings establish that inst
itutions have a stronger effect on shaping immigrants’ political trust than
mean attitudes of their compatriots. Third, the implications of the Great
Expectations effect are explored. The inflated trust of immigrants towards
host institutions results in lower levels of political participation.