Trade-offs in Repugnant Transactio ns: A Choice Experiment (with Julio Elias and Mario Macis)
Abstract:
Societies prohibit many
transactions considered morally repugnant, although potentially efficiency
-enhancing. We conduct an online choice experiment to characterize preferen
ces for the morality and efficiency of payments to kidney donors. The surve
y elicits opinions on several moral issues about allowing payments, shows d
ifferent hypothetical supply effects of compensating donors, and asks respo
ndents to express their support for different types of kidney procurement a
nd allocation systems that would include compensation. Although choices are
based on hypotheticals, we design the survey to include elements of conseq
uentiality and incentive compatibility. Through this experiment we are able
to assess whether cost-benefit considerations affect the acceptance of mor
ally controversial transactions. The analysis also provides insights to pol
icymakers about the role of empirical evidence about the effects of compens
ation for kidney donors in informing the public debate.