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UID:b80bc5021c5960356299e63c90f6974c
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20181008T165710
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Shmuel Zamir - The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p><strong>Judgments Aggregation by a Sequential Majority Procedure</strong
 > (joint with Bezalel Peleg)</p><p>Abstract:</p><p style="text-align: justi
 fy;">We consider a standard model of judgment aggregation as presented, for
  example, in Dietrich (2015). For this model we introduce a sequential majo
 rity procedure (SMP) which uses the majority rule as much as possible. The 
 ordering of the issues is assumed to be exogenous. The definition of SMP is
  given in Section 2. In Section 4 we construct an intuitive relevance relat
 ion for our model, closely related to conditional entailment, for our model
 . While in Dietrich (2015), the relevance relation is given exogenously as 
 part of the model, we insist that the relevance relation be derived from th
 e agenda. We prove that SMP has the property of independence of irrelevant 
 issues (III) with respect to (the transitive closure of) our relevance rela
 tion. As III is weaker than the property of proposition-wise independence (
 PI) we do not run into impossibility results as does List (2004) who incorp
 orates PI in some parts of his analysis. We proceed to characterize SMP by 
 anonymity, restricted monotonicity, local neutrality, restricted agenda pro
 perty, and independence of past deliberations (see Section 3 for the precis
 e details). SMP inherits the first three axioms from the Majority Rule. The
  axiom of restricted agenda property guarantees sequentiality. The most imp
 ortant axiom, independence of past deliberations (IPD), says that the choic
 e at time (t +1) depends only on the choices in dates 1; : : : ; t and the 
 judgments at (t +1) (and not on the judgments in dates 1; : : : ; t) . Also
 , we use this occasion to point out that Roberts (1991) characterization of
  choice by plurality voting may be adapted to our model.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260405T192540Z
DTSTART:20181017T130000Z
DTEND:20181017T140000Z
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