BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:57960b57c50b8dc64da8cd8842e78e7f
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20180507T122920
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Rahul Deb - University of Toronto
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nCompromising Quality to Stay Relevant (joint with Matt Mitchell and Mal
 lesh Pai). \n\n\nAbstract:\nWe study a novel dynamic principal-agent framew
 ork which features adverse selection, moral hazard and no transfers. The mo
 del can be described as a bandit problem where the principal chooses betwee
 n a safe and risky arm, whose type is known and whose output is controlled 
 by a strategic agent. The principal prefers to pull the risky arm only if i
 t is the high type whereas, irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximi
 ze the number of times it is pulled. Our main result shows that when the pr
 incipal can commit, there are conditions under which the optimal dynamic me
 chanism induces efficient output from the risky arm. By contrast, in the ab
 sence of commitment, inefficient output must arise on path in all equilibri
 a (subject to a mild refinement). We use our model to discuss reputation ma
 nagement by online content providers and by experts in organizations.\n
DTSTAMP:20260406T002616Z
DTSTART:20180516T130000Z
DTEND:20180516T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR