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UID:edf5885c8716ec2db2c768f0cd6a2399
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20180424T155535
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Giuseppe Lopomo - Duke University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nOptimal Procurement With Quality Concerns (joint with Nicola Persico)\n
 \n\nAbstract \nWe characterize optimal procurement mechanisms in environmen
 ts where each supplier is privately informed about both its cost and the qu
 ality of its product, and the suppliers' costs are affiliated. If the corre
 lation between each supplier's quality and cost is high relative to the deg
 ree of affiliation among all suppliers' costs, it is optimal for the buyer 
 to either buy from a randomly selected supplier and pay the highest possibl
 e cost, or do nothing, depending on whether the gains from trade are large 
 enough. If instead the degree of affiliation among costs is large relative 
 to the correlation between quality and cost, a standard second-price auctio
 n is optimal. In the remaining case where the affiliation among costs and t
 he quality-cost correlation are both in an intermediate range, it is optima
 l to select the lowest-cost supplier if its cost is sufficiently lower than
  its competitors, and randomly select one supplier otherwise. We also show 
 that the second-price auction is optimal, if there is sufficient uncertaint
 y about the joint cost distribution.\n\n\n \n
DTSTAMP:20260406T013318Z
DTSTART:20180625T130000Z
DTEND:20180625T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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