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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:74b2a1641b9be80811a23d4bbb9f35b6
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20180110T175918
SUMMARY:Fabrizio Mattesini - Università di Roma "Tor Vergata"
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nInflation and Welfare in a Competitive Search Equilibrium with Asymmetr
 ic Information (with Lorenzo Carbonari and Robert J. Waldmann)\n\n\nAbstrac
 t:\nWe study an economy characterised by indivisible goods, competitive sea
 rch and asymmetric information. As in Lagos and Wright [19], agents need ca
 sh to trade in a decentralised market; buyers decide their cash holdings af
 ter observing the contracts posted by firms and experience match-specific p
 reference shockswhich remain unknown to sellers. Firms are allowed to post 
 general contracts specifying a price and a probability to trade, but the op
 timal contract implies a single price so that only those who value the good
  more than that price are able to trade. When the number of potential buyer
 s is bounded, we show that the real price of the good is decreasing in the 
 rate of inflation and, consequently, in the nominal rate of interest. Becau
 se of asymmetric information and indivisibility, monetary policy can exploi
 t this relationship, and welfare is maximised away from the Friedman rule. 
 The same result, but for a different reason, is obtained when the number of
  potential buyers is unlimited and buyers face an entry cost. Excessive ent
 ry causes a congestion effect, and an inflationary monetary policy can impr
 ove ex ante welfare.\n
DTSTAMP:20260405T192354Z
DTSTART:20180305T164500Z
DTEND:20180305T180000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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