BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:5f61bed070055a839247f4d7fddc1492
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20180103T170740
SUMMARY:Mark L. Egan - Harvard University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p><strong>Biased Arbitration</strong> (joint with Gregor Matvos and Amit S
 eru)</p><p><strong>Abstract: </strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">W
 e examine investor outcomes in securities arbitration. Using a novel data s
 et containing roughly 7,000 arbitration cases, we find evidence suggesting 
 that arbitrators exhibit persistent disparity in their decisions. Brokerage
  firms appear to utilize this information in the arbitrator selection proce
 ss. Arbitrators that were more industry-friendly in the past are almost for
 ty percent more likely to be selected relative to arbitrators who were more
  investor-friendly in the past. The FINRA Code of Arbitration Proceedings, 
 which all brokerage firms are bound to, provides both claimants and respond
 ents control over the arbitrator selection process. We develop and estimate
  a structural model of arbitrator selection to quantify the costs and benef
 its of the current arbitrator selection system. In the model arbitrators us
 e their reputation to compete against each other for the attention of claim
 ants and respondents. We find evidence suggesting that limiting respondent'
 s and claimant's inputs over the arbitrator selection process could improve
  outcomes for investors.</p><p><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: '
 Times New Roman','serif';"></span></p>
DTSTAMP:20260406T002708Z
DTSTART:20180517T163000Z
DTEND:20180517T180000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR