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UID:062c1ec94375a88557041f8f899829c9
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20171103T155749
SUMMARY:Nicola Pavoni - Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Optimal Delegation, Unawareness and Financial Intermediation (with Sarah Au
 ster)\nAbstract:\n We study the delegation problem between an investor and 
 a financial intermediary. The intermediary has private information about th
 e state of the world that determines the return of the investment. Moreover
 , he has superior awareness of the available investment opportunities and d
 ecides whether to reveal some of them to the investor. We show that the int
 ermediary has incentives to make the investor aware of investment opportuni
 ties at the extremes, e.g. very risky and very safe projects, while leaving
  the investor unaware of intermediate investment options. We study how the 
 extent to which the intermediary reveals available investment opportunities
  to the investor depends on the investor’s initial awareness and the degree
  of competition between intermediaries in the market. We provide evidence o
 f the mechanism described by the model using self-reported data on small in
 vestor’s experience in the Italian retail investment sector.\n
DTSTAMP:20260405T183303Z
DTSTART:20171106T170000Z
DTEND:20171106T183000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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