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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:062c1ec94375a88557041f8f899829c9
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20171103T155749
SUMMARY:Nicola Pavoni - Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-
 family: 'Calibri','sans-serif';">Optimal Delegation, Unawareness and Financ
 ial Intermediation</span></strong><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family
 : 'Calibri','sans-serif';"> (with Sarah Auster)</span></p><p style="text-al
 ign: justify;"><strong><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Calibri'
 ,'sans-serif';">Abstract:</span></strong><span style="font-size: 11pt; font
 -family: 'Calibri','sans-serif';"><br /> We study the delegation problem be
 tween an investor and a financial intermediary. The intermediary has privat
 e information about the state of the world that determines the return of th
 e investment. Moreover, he has superior awareness of the available investme
 nt opportunities and decides whether to reveal some of them to the investor
 . We show that the intermediary has incentives to make the investor aware o
 f investment opportunities at the extremes, e.g. very risky and very safe p
 rojects, while leaving the investor unaware of intermediate investment opti
 ons. We study how the extent to which the intermediary reveals available in
 vestment opportunities to the investor depends on the investor’s initial aw
 areness and the degree of competition between intermediaries in the market.
  We provide evidence of the mechanism described by the model using self-rep
 orted data on small investor’s experience in the Italian retail investment 
 sector.</span></p>
DTSTAMP:20260405T195906Z
DTSTART:20171106T170000Z
DTEND:20171106T183000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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