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UID:3a02cfd5a6a7af5256b25714c8e162ce
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20171102T185153
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Andrés Liberman - NYU Stern School of Business
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE: Equilibrium Effects of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from a Natural Exp
 eriment in Consumer Credit (with Christopher Neilson, Luis Opazo and Seth Z
 immerman)\n\n\n \nAbstract:\n We investigate the equilibrium effects of inf
 ormation asymmetries in credit markets in the context of a large-scale poli
 cy change that induced an information asymmetry between lenders and consume
 r credit borrowers in Chile. In 2012, Chilean credit bureaus were forced to
  stop reporting past defaults for 2.8 million individuals with relatively l
 ow default amounts. These individuals made up 21% of the country’s adult po
 pulation and approximately 67% of borrowers in default. Using panel data of
  the universe of bank borrowers in Chile, we show that the policy change ha
 d both direct effects on the beneficiaries and equilibrium effects on the b
 roader credit market. We first exploit a discontinuity in eligibility based
  on default amount to show that borrowing rises for the beneficiaries of de
 letion relative to non-beneficiaries following policy implementation. Howev
 er, consumer borrowing falls by approximately 5% for non-beneficiaries in t
 he quarter following policy implementation, while the median interest rate 
 for small loans also rises by 5 percentage points from a base of 27%. Equil
 ibrium responses are larger for individuals who are pooled with relatively 
 more past defaulters based on demographic characteristics observable to len
 ders.\n
DTSTAMP:20260406T005655Z
DTSTART:20170713T130000Z
DTEND:20170713T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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