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UID:32cf348cd805a350026dff81a47b3ee9
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20170426T194632
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Victoria Vanasco - Stanford University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE: A Model of Complexity\n \nAbstract:\n Increased complexity has become a ha
 llmark of both financial regulation and financial products. We consider one
  channel for complexity: deliberately making products more difficult to und
 erstand. We consider an environment in which an agent can choose both the q
 uality of a product and its complexity. Each product must be accepted by a 
 principal who cannot directly observe quality, and whose ability to underst
 and the product’s quality is affected by its complexity. In order to offer 
 products that are acceptable to the principal, agents may increase complexi
 ty even when their products are of high quality and their preferences are p
 erfectly aligned with those of the principal. Moreover, agents with low qua
 lity products and different preferences from those of the principal may sim
 plify their products. We show that the incentive to simplify or to complexi
 ty depends crucially on how urgent it is for the principal to acquire the p
 roduct and on the beliefs about the alignment of preferences between the ag
 ent and the principal.\n
DTSTAMP:20260406T042558Z
DTSTART:20170518T130000Z
DTEND:20170518T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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