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UID:465bfa0ebb2120b248a2b11e0e72e168
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20161213T183908
SUMMARY:Igal Hendel - Northwestern University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:The Welfare Impact of Long-Term Contracts\nAbstract:\nWe present a dynamic 
 model of health insurance with one-sided commitment to assess the welfare i
 mpact of long-term contracting. We use a rich data set with individual-leve
 l data on health risk, health status transitions, insurance choices, and co
 nsumer demographics to empirically study equilibrim these dynamic contracts
  and assess their positive and normative implications. We compare these out
 comes under (i) spot contracts (ii) long-run contracts with two-sided commi
 tment (iii) long-term contracts with one-sided commitment and (iv) ACA-like
  markets with spot contracts and community rating. Empirically, dynamic con
 tracts with one-sided commitment achieve close to the first-best, relative 
 to spot contracts, for consumers with flat income profiles who are happy to
  front-load payments to facilitate long-run insurance. Consumers with steep
 er income growth over their lifetimes get a lower benefit from these contra
 cts because front-loading payments is relatively costly.\n Dynamic contract
 s are preferred to the ACA-like markets we investigate for consumers with f
 latter income profiles, but not preferred for consumers with steeper income
  profiles.\n
DTSTAMP:20260404T034854Z
DTSTART:20150917T173000Z
DTEND:20150917T190000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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