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UID:47dc4af3e5b2386eed02032737aa9c47
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20161213T181716
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Anton Tsoy - EIEF
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Auction Design with Advised Bidders\nAbstract:\nThis paper studies efficien
 t and optimal auction design where bidders do not know their values and sol
 icit advice from informed but biased advisors via a cheap-talk game. When a
 dvisors are biased toward overbidding, we characterize efficient equilibria
  of static auctions and equilibria of the English auction under the NITS co
 ndition (Chen, Kartik and Sobel (2008)). In static auctions, advisors trans
 mit a coarsening of their information and a version of the revenue equivale
 nce holds. In contrast, in the English auction, information is transmitted 
 perfectly from types in the bottom of the distribution, and pooling happens
  only at the top. Under NITS, any equilibrium of the English auction domina
 tes any efficient equilibrium of any static auction in terms of both effici
 ency and the seller’s revenue. The distinguishing feature of the English au
 ction is that information can be transmitted over time and bidders cannot s
 ubmit bids below the current price of the auction. This results in a higher
  efficiency due to better information transmission and allows the seller to
  extract additional profits from the overbidding bias of advisors. We show 
 that the gain in efficiency and revenue from switching to the English aucti
 on from the second-price auction is qualitatively large for M&A deals. When
  advisors are biased toward underbidding, there is an equilibrium of the Du
 tch auction that is more efficient than any efficient equilibrium of any st
 atic auction, however, it can bring lower expected revenue.\n
DTSTAMP:20260404T050336Z
DTSTART:20150717T130000Z
DTEND:20150717T140000Z
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