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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:14b6b6a366ec6e89db3daf73dc78e7c3
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20161213T181243
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Fabrizio Perri - FED Minneapolis
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>On the Desirability of Capital Cont
 rols </strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstract:</p><p style="te
 xt-align: justify;">In the first part we study a standard two country inter
 national macro model we ask whether shutting down the market for internatio
 nal non-contingent borrowing and lending is ever desirable. The answer is y
 es. Imposing capital controls is unilaterally desirable when initial condit
 ions are such that ruling out bond trade generates a sufficiently favorable
  change in the expected path for the terms of trade. Imposing capital contr
 ols can be welfare improving for both countries for calibrations in which e
 quilibrium terms of trade movements improve insurance against country speci
 fic shocks. I n the second part we study capital controls in environments w
 ith rigid labor markets. There the case for capital controls can be stronge
 r, and is based on the fact that capital inflows can increase the cost of l
 abor, thereby inducing unemployment.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260404T050400Z
DTSTART:20150714T130000Z
DTEND:20150714T140000Z
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TRANSP:OPAQUE
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