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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:9a5da2264a48f3c54730a4ddfa25549b
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20161213T181137
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Roberto Robatto - Wisconsin School of Business
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:A Theory of Non-Contingent Nominal Deposit Contracts\nAbstract:\nWhy are de
 posit contracts nominal and non-contingent on the aggregate price level? To
  answer this question, I present an extension of the Diamond-Dybvig model w
 ith informational frictions that prevent the aggregate state and the price 
 level from being fully observed, and in which money is required for transac
 tions. The optimal contract is nominal and non-contingent and the decentral
 ized equilibrium supports the constrained first-best allocation. Allowing f
 or the possibility of paying a fixed cost to acquire information about the 
 aggregate state, the nominal non-contingent contract is strictly preferred 
 to a contingent contract even if the fixed cost is very small.\n
DTSTAMP:20260404T050336Z
DTSTART:20150713T130000Z
DTEND:20150713T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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