BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:9a5da2264a48f3c54730a4ddfa25549b
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20161213T181137
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Roberto Robatto - Wisconsin School of Business
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>A Theory of Non-Contingent Nominal 
 Deposit Contracts</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstract:</p>
 <p style="text-align: justify;">Why are deposit contracts nominal and non-c
 ontingent on the aggregate price level? To answer this question, I present 
 an extension of the Diamond-Dybvig model with informational frictions that 
 prevent the aggregate state and the price level from being fully observed, 
 and in which money is required for transactions. The optimal contract is no
 minal and non-contingent and the decentralized equilibrium supports the con
 strained first-best allocation. Allowing for the possibility of paying a fi
 xed cost to acquire information about the aggregate state, the nominal non-
 contingent contract is strictly preferred to a contingent contract even if 
 the fixed cost is very small.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260404T050640Z
DTSTART:20150713T130000Z
DTEND:20150713T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR