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UID:0e3546598f5d7fe82988cac4956d4756
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20161213T175842
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Raquel Fernandez - New York University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The Long and the Short of It: Sover
 eign Debt Crises and Debt Maturity</strong></p><p style="text-align: justif
 y;">Abstract:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">We present a simple model 
 of sovereign debt crises in which a country chooses its optimal mix of shor
 t and long-term debt contracts subject to standard contracting frictions: t
 he country cannot commit to repay its debts nor to a specific path of futur
 e debt issues, and contracts cannot be made state contingent nor renegotiat
 ed. We show that, in order to satisfy incentive compatibility, the country 
 must issue short- term debt, which exposes it to roll-over crises and ineff
 icient repayments. We examine two policies restructuring and reprofiling an
 d show that both improve ex ante welfare if structured correctly. Key to th
 e welfare results is the country’s ability to choose its debt structure so 
 as to neutralize any negative effect resulting from the redistribution of p
 ayments across creditors in times of crises.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260404T050401Z
DTSTART:20150702T130000Z
DTEND:20150702T140000Z
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