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UID:6bc6475eb15d1220ecdbb226996a2494
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20240723T071928
SUMMARY:Matthias Doepke - London School of Economics
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nPrivate Information in the Family\n\n\nAbstract:\nWe examine the role o
 f private information within families. Optimal risk sharing under full info
 rmation implies that relative consumption should be independent of relative
  income within couples, whereas a positive relationship arises under optima
 l incentive-constrained insurance with private information. We assemble a n
 ew data set based on Dutch panel data that contains evidence on private inf
 ormation within couples. When we split the sample into couples that are ful
 ly informed about each other's income and those that are not, a positive re
 lationship between income and consumption shares emerges only among those w
 ho are not fully informed about each other's income. This holds true when a
 dding couple fixed effects, so that, indeed, a change in relative income wi
 thin a given couple affects their consumption sharing. In contrast, measure
 s of the degree of commitment have no impact on risk sharing once private i
 nformation is controlled for. We interpret these findings using a model of 
 optimal-incentive constrained insurance that (unlike approaches based on th
 e revelation principle) does not require full disclosure of private informa
 tion as part of the optimal mechanism.\n
DTSTAMP:20260406T143519Z
DTSTART:20250407T163000Z
DTEND:20250407T180000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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