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UID:b9a73a1eba8dbe59546c0234cd6340ae
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20150210T181541
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Mikhail Golosov - Princeton University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment\nAbstract:
 \nWe study the optimal provision of insurance against unobservable idiosync
 ratic shocks in a setting in which a benevolent government cannot commit. A
  continuum of agents and the government play an infinitely repeated game. A
 ctions of the government are constrained only by the threat of reverting to
  the worst subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). We construct a recursive prob
 lem that characterizes the resource allocation and information revelation o
 n the Pareto frontier of the SPE and show incentives to reveal information 
 are provided by promised utilities. We prove a version of the Revelation Pr
 inciple and find an upper bound on the maximum number of messages that are 
 needed to achieve the optimal allocation. Agents play mixed strategies over
  that message set to limit the amount of information transmitted to the gov
 ernment. The central feature of the optimal contract is that it is optimal 
 for agents who enter a period with low promised utility to provide no infor
 mation to the government, and receive no insurance against shocks they expe
 rience in current period, while agents with high promised utility reveal pr
 ecise information about their current shock and receive insurance as in eco
 nomies with full commitment by the government.\n
DTSTAMP:20260406T102909Z
DTSTART:20140528T130000Z
DTEND:20140528T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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