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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:1adbf746d7cbdc1acb4c8378b929647b
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20180213T160723
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Mark Armstrong - University of Oxford
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-
 family: 'Calibri','sans-serif'; color: black;">Competition with Captive Cus
 tomers</span></strong><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Calibri',
 'sans-serif'; color: black;"> (with John Vickers)</span></p><p style="margi
 n-bottom: 6pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-fam
 ily: 'Calibri','sans-serif'; color: black;"><strong>Abstract:</strong> </sp
 an></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-f
 amily: 'Calibri','sans-serif'; color: black;">We analyse competition in set
 tings where customers vary in how many price offers they compare; some are 
 ‘captive’ to just one supplier.  Allowing firms to discriminate between cus
 tomer types (captive or not) is bad for consumers overall when firms are sy
 mmetric and consumers cannot affect how many offers they see, but may be go
 od otherwise.  The effects of entry by a new firm depend on its <em>pattern
 </em> – i.e. which consumer segments the entrant serves.  Entry within a no
 n-captive segment is bad for consumers, but entry is pro-consumer in the ca
 se of ‘independent reach’, for which we also examine merger effects.  A dif
 ferent type of mixed strategy equilibrium appears in the case of ‘nested re
 ach’, with different firms competing in high and low price ranges.  To expl
 ore how market outcomes depend on the pattern of competition, we solve the 
 general three-firm case.</span></p>
DTSTAMP:20260404T125543Z
DTSTART:20180227T130000Z
DTEND:20180227T140000Z
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