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UID:193110095d9cd0cae7c6f7f81f039e64
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20150504T163306
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Sebastian Buhai - Stockholm University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Worker-Firm Dynamics with Seniority Bargaining (joint with Miguel Portela a
 nd Coen Teulings)\nAbstract:\n In this paper we provide theoretical and emp
 irical microfoundations for worker seniority (a worker’s tenure relative to
  the tenure of all her co-workers at the firm) as natural bargaining device
  in large firms with stochastic product demand and irreversible firm-specif
 ic investments required for each newly hired worker. The firm and its worke
 rs simultaneously bargain for layoff order and wage schedule, whereupon inf
 ramarginal senior workers get wage premia and layoff insurance. Buhai et al
  (2014, ECTA) have already shown empirically that wages increase and job ex
 it hazard decreases with seniority, on exhaustive linked-employer-employee-
 data from Denmark and Portugal. Using the same data and econometric methodo
 logy adapted from Buhai and Teulings (2014, JBES) and Buhai et al (2014, EC
 TA), here we prove that the seniority profile in wages is a proxy for the r
 eturn to the extent of necessary worker-firm irreversible specific investme
 nts.\n
DTSTAMP:20260406T084019Z
DTSTART:20150327T130000Z
DTEND:20150327T140000Z
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TRANSP:OPAQUE
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