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UID:a782c848ed0a4d74c701012e2443f082
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20150211T194417
SUMMARY:Erika Deserranno - London School of Economics (Job Market Seminar)
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment
  of Health Workers\nAbstract:\nI study the role of financial incentives as 
 signals of job attributes when these are unknown to potential applicants. I
  create experimental variation in expected earnings and use it to estimate 
 the effect of financial incentives on candidates' perception of a newly cre
 ated health worker position in Uganda and, through this, on the size and co
 mposition of the applicant pool. I find that more lucrative positions are p
 erceived as entailing a lower positive externality for the community, and d
 iscourage agents with strong prosocial preferences from applying. While hig
 her financial incentives attract more applicants and increase the probabili
 ty of filling a vacancy, they hamper retention and performance. This is bec
 ause the signal they convey reduces the ability to recruit the most sociall
 y motivated agents, who are found to stay longer on the job and to perform 
 better.\n
DTSTAMP:20260406T085558Z
DTSTART:20150204T173000Z
DTEND:20150204T190000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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