BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:a782c848ed0a4d74c701012e2443f082
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20150211T194417
SUMMARY:Erika Deserranno - London School of Economics (Job Market Seminar)
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Financial Incentives as Signals: Ex
 perimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Health Workers</strong></p><p s
 tyle="text-align: justify;">Abstract:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I 
 study the role of financial incentives as signals of job attributes when th
 ese are unknown to potential applicants. I create experimental variation in
  expected earnings and use it to estimate the effect of financial incentive
 s on candidates' perception of a newly created health worker position in Ug
 anda and, through this, on the size and composition of the applicant pool. 
 I find that more lucrative positions are perceived as entailing a lower pos
 itive externality for the community, and discourage agents with strong pros
 ocial preferences from applying. While higher financial incentives attract 
 more applicants and increase the probability of filling a vacancy, they ham
 per retention and performance. This is because the signal they convey reduc
 es the ability to recruit the most socially motivated agents, who are found
  to stay longer on the job and to perform better.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260406T085917Z
DTSTART:20150204T173000Z
DTEND:20150204T190000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR