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UID:9c95f859b274bce50521b26b796d5b72
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20170421T173141
SUMMARY:Jeffrey Ely - Northwestern University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Dynamic Information Design: Two Examples\nAbstracts:\njoint with Laura Dova
 l:\n We take as given the set of agents, their set of actions, and their pa
 yoffs. We ask what distributions over actions are consistent with the playe
 rs playing according to some extensive form. The main result of the paper i
 s to show that a distribution over outcomes is implementable as a Perfect B
 ayesian equilibrium (PBE) of an admissible extensive form if, and only if, 
 it is implementable as a PBE of a canonical extensive form. The la er is an
  admissible extensive form, in which there is a randomization device that n
 ot only sends (private) recommendations to the agents, but also selects the
  order in which the agents move; moreover, subsequent recommendations can b
 e made conditional on actions already taken. This result strictly generaliz
 es Aumann’s notion of correlated equilibrium, and Bergemann and Morris’ [3]
  notion of Bayes’ correlated equilibrium.\njoint with Martin Szydlowski:\n 
 We study information as an incentive device in a dynamic moral hazard frame
 work. An agent works on a project of uncertain difficulty, modeled as durat
 ion of required effort. The principal knows the task difficulty and can pro
 vide information over time with the goal of inducing maximal effort. The op
 timal mechanism features moving goalposts: an initial disclosure makes the 
 agent sufficiently optimistic that the task is easy in order to induce him 
 to start working. If the task is indeed difficult the agent is told this on
 ly after working long enough to put the difficult task within reach. Then t
 he agent completes the difficult task even though he never would have chose
 n to at the outset. The optimal dynamic disclosure policy improves on any s
 ingle-stage persuasion mechanism even though the fundamentals of the proble
 m are all essentially static.\n
DTSTAMP:20260512T164208Z
DTSTART:20161010T173000Z
DTEND:20161010T190000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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