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UID:8d21048ec3636504d8d52af94b8e2a3e
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20230720T080438
SUMMARY:Thomas Sampson - Lonson School of Economics
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p>Trade, Innovation and Optimal Patent Protection</p><p>Abstract:</p><p st
 yle="text-align: justify;">This paper studies optimal patent policy in open
  economies. We develop a quantitative model of patenting that integrates He
 lpman-Krugman and Eaton-Kortum trade with Romerian growth. The theory captu
 res the trade-off between the innovation and market power effects of patent
  protection. We calibrate the model to estimate patent protection by destin
 ation and the geography of innovation. Counterfactual analysis shows that s
 tronger patent protection has global benefits but local costs, resulting in
  inefficiently weak protection. There are large potential gains from global
  cooperation, but realizing these gains requires more innovative economies 
 to offer stronger protection. By pushing towards policy harmonization the T
 RIPS agreement reduces global welfare, with developing countries bearing th
 e costs.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260408T173851Z
DTSTART:20231120T143000Z
DTEND:20231120T160000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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