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UID:1799b377419f73a496e17507205e7d50
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20230504T122213
SUMMARY:Jan Eeckhout - Universitat Pompeu Fabra
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nAre Managers Paid for Market Power?\n\n\nAbstract:\nThe rapid increase 
 in executive compensation since the late 1980s can be attributed to the ris
 e of firm size in the upper tail of the firm size distribution. But in that
  period, market power also increases sharply. Firm size and market power ar
 e determined simultaneously and both affect profitability, and hence manage
 r pay. We propose a theory of executive compensation that incorporates olig
 opolistic competition in the product market. This theory allows us to decom
 pose and quantify the contribution to manager pay of firm size and of marke
 t power. We find that market power contributes an average of 45.8%, which h
 as been rising from 38.0% in 1994 to 48.8% in 2019. Most strikingly, there 
 is significant heterogeneity across managers: in 2019, 80.3% of top manager
  pay was due to market power. We conclude that top managers are hired dispr
 oportionately by firms with market power, and they get rewarded for it, inc
 reasingly so.\n
DTSTAMP:20260424T193157Z
DTSTART:20231016T023000Z
DTEND:20231016T160000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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