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UID:fecbd711bf5ee1df141eebb60cd065a4
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20230216T070633
SUMMARY:David Schönholzer - Stockholm University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nSupermajority Requirements and Voter Preferences in U.S. School Capital
  Investments\n\n\nAbstract:\nPolitical institutions determine how preferenc
 es translate into public goods provision. But how do changes in these insti
 tutions shift the balance between different stakeholders, and how do these 
 shifts ultimately affect economic outcomes? We study this question in the c
 ontext of school capital investments in the U.S., where states require a ma
 jority of voters in school districts to agree to capital bonds, ranging fro
 m 50% to 67% across states. We build a probabilistic voting model of school
  districts that strategically design and propose bonds in light of their vo
 ters’ preferences and their supermajority requirement. Using a newly assemb
 led dataset of more than 10,000 bond referenda, we then estimate the struct
 ural parameters of this model and validate it with the reduction of the sup
 ermajority requirement in California in 2001. We then estimate counterfactu
 al capital investments in supermajority states if bond passage only require
 d a simple majority of voters. We estimate large changes in the size of inv
 estments, although voter preferences and fiscal regimes play an important r
 ole as well. We also evaluate changes in the effectiveness and efficiency o
 f these investments, as well as the long-run impact on student achievement.
 \n
DTSTAMP:20260424T181232Z
DTSTART:20231012T143000Z
DTEND:20231012T160000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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