Supermajority Requirements and Voter Preferences in U.S. School Capital Investments
Abstract:
Political in stitutions determine how preferences translate into public goods provision. But how do changes in these institutions shift the balance between differe nt stakeholders, and how do these shifts ultimately affect economic outcome s? We study this question in the context of school capital investments in t he U.S., where states require a majority of voters in school districts to a gree to capital bonds, ranging from 50% to 67% across states. We build a pr obabilistic voting model of school districts that strategically design and propose bonds in light of their voters’ preferences and their supermajority requirement. Using a newly assembled dataset of more than 10,000 bond refe renda, we then estimate the structural parameters of this model and validat e it with the reduction of the supermajority requirement in California in 2 001. We then estimate counterfactual capital investments in supermajority s tates if bond passage only required a simple majority of voters. We estimat e large changes in the size of investments, although voter preferences and fiscal regimes play an important role as well. We also evaluate changes in the effectiveness and efficiency of these investments, as well as the long- run impact on student achievement.
DTSTAMP:20260424T181733Z DTSTART:20231012T143000Z DTEND:20231012T160000Z SEQUENCE:0 TRANSP:OPAQUE END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR