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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:1f5a3bc9de76596eab7433e282654e7c
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20161216T181937
SUMMARY:Francesco Sobbrio - LUISS Guido Carli
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Voters’ Response to Public Policies: Evidence from a Natural Experiment\nAb
 stract:\nThis paper analyzes the voters’ response to a public policy by exp
 loiting a natural experiment arising from the 2006 Collective Clemency Bill
  in Italy. The design of the Bill created idiosyncratic incentives to recid
 ivate across pardoned individuals. Our results show that these individual i
 ncentives created different policy effects across municipalities. Cities wh
 ere the incentives to recidivate of pardoned individuals resident in that m
 unicipality were higher, experienced a higher recidivism rate. At the same 
 time, a higher incentive to recidivate at the municipal level lead to: a) n
 ewspapers reporting more crime news relative to the pre-pardon period (as w
 ell as more crime news involving pardoned individuals); b) voters holding w
 orse beliefs on the incumbent government’s crime control policies. Finally,
  the incumbent government’s experienced a worse electoral performance in th
 e April 2008 elections relative to the opposition coalition in municipaliti
 es where pardoned individuals had a higher incentive to recidivate. Overall
 , we provide direct empirical evidence showing that voters receive private 
 signals consistent with the effects of public policies. In turn, they use t
 hese information to form their posterior beliefs on the quality of the incu
 mbent government’s policies. Ultimately, voters keep the incumbent governme
 nt accountable by conditioning their vote on their posterior beliefs.\n
DTSTAMP:20260404T230054Z
DTSTART:20151203T173000Z
DTEND:20151203T190000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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