BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT UID:f676383e18e4acc0b0456c1ee50ae650 CATEGORIES:Seminars CREATED:20150504T142148 SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Ganna Pogrebna - Warwick University DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:

Are Donors Afraid of Charities’ Core Costs? Scale Economie s in Non-profit Provisionand Charity Selection

Abstract: 

We study contesta bility in non-profit markets where non-commercial providers supply a homoge neous collective good through increasing-returns-to-scale technologies. Unl ike in the case of for-profit competition, in the non-profit case the absen ce of price-based sales contracts means that fixed costs are directly relev ant to donors, and that they can translate into an entry barrier, protectin g the position of an inefficient incumbent; or that, conversely, they can m ake it possible for inefficient newcomers to contest the position of a more efficient incumbent. Evidence from laboratory experiments show that fixed cost driven trade-offs between payoff dominance and perceived risk can lead to inefficient selection.

DTSTAMP:20260404T074109Z DTSTART:20150304T130000Z DTEND:20150304T140000Z SEQUENCE:0 TRANSP:OPAQUE END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR